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NOTE
THE PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYMENT ACT OF
1977 AND MINORITY CONTRACTING
A national commitment to promote the development and ongoing via-
bility of minority owned businesses (MBEs)l has existed since the late
1960's.2 In response to a growing recognition that the simple prohibition
of racially discriminatory employment and contracting practices alone
would not significantly increase minority participation 3 in private enter-
prise, a number of federal assistance programs were initiated in the early
1970's. 4 As a result, a substantial federal scheme presently exists to foster
MBE development, 5 as well as a growing number of governmental pro-
grams requiring increasingly vigorous "affirmative action"6 on the part of
1. The term "minority" is generally defined as including United States citizens who
are Negro, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo and Aleut. This definition is used in
most federal minority business affirmative action efforts. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.1303, 1-
1.1310-2 (1977); Public Works Employment Act of 1977, § 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §
6705(0(2) (West Supp. 1978). In other contexts, a somewhat different definition has been
offered. See the Small Business Administration's (SBA) minority procurement program
regulation, 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1 (1978) (discussed at note 41 iffra) and Exec. Order No.
11,625, 3 C.F.R. §§ 616-620 (1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 631 app., at 1138 (1976) (both
use "socially or economically disadvantaged" criteria); Department of Transportation Order
4000.7A, Minority Business Enterprise Program (Mar. 6, 1978); Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("4 Rs Act"), § 905, 45 U.S.C.A. § 803 (West Supp. 1978); 49
C.F.R. § 265.5 (1977) (all include women).
A minority business enterprise (MBE) is generally defined as: "a business, at least 50 per
centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of publicly owned busi-
nesses, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group members."
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, § 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(0(2) (West Supp.
1977); see also 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.1303, 1-1.1310-2 (1978).
2. In March, 1969, President Nixon, as part of his black capitalism program, issued
Exec. Order No. 11,458, 3 C.F.R. § 779 (1966-1970 Compilation) which set out a national
policy of promoting minority business ownership and development. It was reissued in 1971
as Exec. Order No. 11,625, 3 C.F.R. § 616 (1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 631 app., at 1138
(1976). See note 26 infra.
3. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 'CLEARINGHOUSE PuB. No. 54, STATE-
MENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 6 (1977); Comment, Race Quotas, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 128, 147 (1973).
4. For a discussion of these programs, see notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 40-50 and accompanying text infra.
6. The term "affirmative action" is generally understood to mean that positive, active
measures must be taken to seek out and assist capable minority group members in order to
fulfill nondiscrimination responsibilities. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.1300 to 1-1.1310-2
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federal contractors.
Despite these federal efforts, the level of MBE involvement has re-
mained disproportionately low, not only in the business community at
large 7 but in federal contracting programs8 in particular. As a result,
more ambitious affirmative action schemes have been introduced to in-
crease the level of MBE participation. 9 One of the most recent and most
controversial is the MBE provision' ° contained within the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977." I In order to ensure a significant level of mi-
nority business involvement in the public works program, the provision
mandates a ten percent "set-aside" in each grant for exclusive minority
business participation. 12 By establishing this specific and relatively rigid
MBE utilization requirement in a nationwide program,' 3 the provision ex-
tends significantly beyond the affirmative action goals and timetables ap-
(1977) (requiring federal prime and subcontractors to take positive steps to seek out and use
MBEs in federal contracts); "4 Rs Act", § 905, 45 U.S.C.A. § 803 (West Supp. 1978); 49
C.F.R. §§ 265.1, 265.7(a)(5)(1977) (race can be taken into account as part of an affirmative
action remedial scheme).
7. See note 30 infra.
8. See note 31 infra.
9. See, e.g., Department of Transportation Order 4000.7A, Minority Business Enter-
prise Program (Mar. 6, 1978) which encourages the use of MBE "set-asides" to reach re-
quired MBE percentage goals and supports increased MBE participation even if it results in
higher costs to the Department. Under this provision, contracts, or sections of contracts,
can be "set-aside" for exclusive minority business competition.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (West Supp. 1978). This subsection provides:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be
made under this chapter for any local public works project unless the applicant
gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the
amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprise.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701 to 6710 (West Supp. 1978). The Act provides for six billion
dollars in grant funds to be obligated by December 31, 1978. An extension was introduced
in the House but failed to pass. See H.R. 11,610, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC.
H2184 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1978).
12. In order to qualify for funds, a grantee must assure the Economic Development
Administration that at least ten percent of the grant dollars will go to MBE contractors,
subcontractors or suppliers. This "set-aside" allows grantees to choose the methods by
which they will reach the ten percent requirement and the specific allocation among the
contracts to be let. See ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (EDA), U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR 10% MINORITY BUSINESS PARTICIPATION IN LPW GRANTS 7-
9 (August, 1977) [hereinafter cited as EDA GUIDELINES) for the various methods by which
grantees can satisfy this requirement. This procedure must be differentiated from the use of
MBE set-asides in the direct procurement context, in which competition for some contracts
will be specifically limited to MBEs (see note 9 supra) and for which a body of federal law
exists. See Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1000 to 1-1.2302-5 (1977).
13. Although this percentage figure is an inflexible one, a waiver provision does exist.
Under EDA guidelines, the waiver can be triggered if the grantee can demonstrate that
"there are not sufficient, relevant, qualified minority business enterprises whose market ar-
eas include the project location." EDA GUIDELINES, supra note 12, at 14. However, in an
attempt to ensure that serious efforts are made to seek out MBEs, EDA has made the waiver
very difficult to obtain. Id at 13-15.
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proach sanctioned by the courts. 14 As a purely racial classification, the
MBE measure is also distinguishable from other affirmative action meas-
ures and set-asides which utilize non-racial criteria.1
5
As predicted, numerous lawsuits have been filed by general contracting
corporations challenging the provision's constitutionality.' 6 They allege it
is an invidious race quota violative of the fifth amendment and of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 Since it requires a specific percentage of
minority participation in a national federal program, the provision may
have significant implications which reach far beyond the duration of the
14. See notes 53-60 and accompanying text infra. These programs, also based on race,
have been limited to particular metropolitan areas and to specific trades. Although sanc-
tioned in the areas of employment and education, the analogy to minority business enter-
prise can easily be made.
15. These include the SBA's Section 8(a) procurement program (see note 41 infra)
which utilizes "socially or economically disadvantaged" criteria, see 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1
(1978) and note 1 supra, and other set-asides, e.g. the Federal Procurement Regulation small
business set-asides, 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.706-1(c) (1978) and labor surplus set-asides, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 644(d) (West Supp. 1978).
16. Final decisions have been reached by several district courts holding the provision
constitutional. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-
4218 (D. Kan., Dec. 19, 1977); Rhode Island Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F.
Supp. 338 (D.R.I. 1978). See notes 79-89 and accompanying text, infra. One district court
has found the provision unconstitutional on its face and granted prospective relief only;
however, that decision, on appeal to the Supreme Court, was vacated and remanded to con-
sider the question of mootness. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Com-
merce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3132 (1978); arjd
on remand No. 77-3738 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1978). See also notes 95-97 and accompanying
text infra. One district court found the provision unconstitutional as applied to only the
narrow set of facts before it. Wright Farms Constr., Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Vt.
1977). See also Montana Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 47 U.S.L.W. 2385
(D. Mont. Dec. 19, 1978) (finding MBE set-aside violative of standards set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978)). See also
notes 91-94 and accompanying text infra.
Several district courts have denied preliminary injunctions holding that the plaintiffs
failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. See, e.g., Virginia
Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1167 (W.D. Va. 1978).
Several courts of appeals have affirmed such denials of preliminary injunctions. See, e.g.,
Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), affg 443 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978), ap g 441 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. Pa.
1977); Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Economic Dev. Administration, No. 78-3053 (6th Cir. July
7, 1978), aff'g No. C-1-77-619 (S.D. Ohio, Nov. 22, 1977).
In all, over 25 lawsuits have been filed by general contracting groups nationwide. Ad-
dress by Assistant Attorney General Drew Days, Civil Rights Symposium sponsored by
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (June 21, 1978).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)-1(1976). The fifth amendment requires that all United States
residents be afforded equal protection under the laws. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954). Title VI prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color or national origin in
the distribution of services and benefits under any program receiving federal financial assist-
ance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1976).
Note
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program itself.'8 This Note will evaluate the provision's constitutionality
and its effectiveness as an affirmative action tool, emphasizing the role of
federal contracting in promoting minority business ownership and devel-
opment.
I. MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN THE FEDERAL CONTRACTING PROCESS
A. National Policy Goals
The contracting opportunities provided by the federal government
through direct procurement and grants programs are substantial. 19 The
government's power to contract has traditionally included the authority to
determine its own business terms and conditions.20 This policy has been
based on the "right-privilege" distinction, 21 which has not been without its
critics.22 Although it appears that such power has specific limitations,
23 it
18. At the present time, all grants have been obligated under the program and Congress
must approve any extension; therefore, the legislature can evaluate, at that time, whether the
MBE provision remains necessary and reasonable. See also note 11 psura.
19. "Federal contracting plays a significant role in the economy, purchasing an amount
equal to 4.8% of the gross national product in FY 1972." U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, MINORITIES AND WOMEN As GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 2 (1975). For exam-
ple, federal procurement of goods and services from private contractors totalled $57.5 billion
in fiscal year 1972. Id Information available for fiscal year 1977 shows total agency pro-
curement at $81.5 billion, including over $57 billion for the Department of Defense alone,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY AND CIVIL FUNCTIONS PROCUREMENT BY CLAIMANT
PROGRAM (1977), and over $24 billion for civilian agencies, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINIS-
TRATION, PROCUREMENT BY CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1,
1976-SEPTEMBER 30, 1977. In addition, federal grants totalled $39.1 billion in fiscal year
1973, see Morgan, Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts.- Giving Form to an
Unconstrained Administrative Process, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 301, 303 n.12, and will have in-
creased to an estimated $71.6 billion to state and local governments in fiscal year 1978. See
Don Sowle Associates, Inc., The Potential for Minority Business Participation in Federal
Assistance Programs 1 (May 15, 1978) (report prepared for Systems Technology Int'l Market
Corp., Washington, D.C.).
The funds dispensed under the Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701 to
6710 (West Supp. 1978) are in the form of grants. The grantee state/city contracts out the
construction of the public works projects to private contractors, using the federal funds.
20. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113; 127 (1940). See generally Morgan,
supra note 19, at 319-20.
21. See id. It has been argued that a contractor has no right to work for the govern-
ment, but only a privilege, and therefore attaching conditions to this privilege is an appro-
priate governmental initiative. Arguably, this power to attach conditions is even greater
when the funds are in the form of grants, i.e. government "largesse." Cf. Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309, 319 (197 1) (system of home visits by welfare caseworker held not unreasonable
search, especially since funds are "charitable" and "public"). See generally Morgan, supra
note 19, at 323-24.
22. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 19, at 320 nn.88 & 89. For discussion of the view-
point that the right-privilege distinction is eroding, see id at 320-22.
23. For example, the government should not be allowed to impose unconstitutional or
irrational conditions on a contractor. The former limitation is particularly relevant here,
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has enabled the federal government, through its multitudinous contracting
programs, to include various "nonprocurement objectives" or "national
goals" clauses in its contracts. 24 To promote equal employment opportu-
nity, this policy prerogative has been supplemented by a specific "affirma-
tive action" authorization through Executive Order 11,24625 which
requires all federal contracting agencies to include a nondiscrimination
and affirmative action employment clause in every government contract.
The national policy of promoting MBE development embodied in Execu-
tive Order 11,62526 further seeks to "eliminate the barriers which now pre-
vent many who are members of minority groups from controlling their fair
share of American business." 27
It has also been noted that the government has a special responsibility to
ensure that public funds are not spent in a manner which furthers racial
discrimination.28 Arguably, then, it is a proper governmental prerogative
to delineate the appropriate levels of affirmative action necessary to attain
the national goal of a nondiscriminatory society, and to implement those
given the constitutional challenges to the Public Works Employment Act's MBE provision.
Id at 322-25. It has also been suggested that the ideal system of determining national
policy goals to be included in federal contracts is one which "combines the safeguards and
sense of legitimacy of the legislative process with the flexibility and responsiveness of the
Executive Branch." Id at 307.
24. Id at 301-02, These national goals clauses take many forms and include, for exam-
ple, small business and labor surplus set-asides, see note 15 supra; balance of payments set-
asides, 31 U.S.C. § 938 (1976); construction contract requirements to pay prevailing wages
on federal contracts under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-5 (1976), imple-
mented in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 to 1.17 (1977); contract employment preferences for Vietnam
veterans, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976); public works contracts requirements to "Buy American"
even if it results in higher costs, 41 U.S.C. § 10b (1976). The latter three provisions all
appear in the Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701 to 6710 (West Supp.
1978).
25. 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1965), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. § 320
(1967), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 10294 (1976).
26. 3 C.F.R. § 616 (1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 631 app., at 1138 (1976). This Order
strengthened its predecessor, Executive Order No. 11,458, which had established the Office
of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) within the Department of Commerce. OMBE
was given expanded responsibility to develop programs and coordinate interagency activi-
ties in order to encourage the formation and development of MBEs.
27. Special Message to the Congress Urging Expansion of the Minority Business Enter-
prise Program, 1971 Pun. PAPERS 1041, 1045.
28. "Neither the President nor the Congress nor the conscience of this nation can permit
money which comes from all the people to be used in a way that discriminates against some
of the people." Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union, 1971 Pun. PAPERS
50, 54. "Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races con-
tribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in
racial discrimination." Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (quoting Sen. Humphrey
during debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 110 CONG. REc. 6543 (1963)). See also
Nash, Affirmative Action under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225, 229 n.27
(1971).
Note
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procedures most likely to bring about that goal through federal contracting
provisions. 29 The practical impact on the business community of such na-
tional goals provisions can be significant, due to the extent to which federal
dollars filter down through prime contractors and subcontractors of goods
and services.
B. Problems Faced by Minority Business Enterprises
Minority business owners have been, and continue to be, severely under-
represented in the business community, 30 especially in federal contracting
programs.31 This low level of participation has been attributed to a
number of factors, including an inability to secure working capital, 32 diffi-
culties in obtaining bonding,33 lack of experience in management and bid-
ding skills, 3" the historical subjectivity of the subcontracting process, 35 the
29. This prerogative has gained support from the combined efforts and commitment of
the executive and legislative branches. Judicial sanction of these measures provides conclu-
sive affirmation of their constitutionality.
30. In 1972, minority-owned businesses represented 3.9% of the total number of estab-
lishments in the construction industry and gross receipts for the minority-owned firms were
about one percent of total receipts. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 553 (1977). The record is no better in either the wholesale trade
(1.3% of total firms and .5% of receipts) or in the manufacturing industry (2.1% of total firms
and .1% of receipts). Id See also 122 CONG. REC. S7147 (daily ed. May 13, 1976) (re-
marks of Sen. Javits); 122 CONG. REC. S17907 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Muskie, quoting Sen. Glenn who noted that only .65% of total national gross business re-
ceipts are realized by MBEs); 124 CONG. REC. E985 (daily ed. March 2, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. Hamilton).
31. In fiscal year 1972, less than one percent of total federal contracting dollars went to
minority and female-owned firms. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 2.
Five years later, with 1976 data, the situation remained unchanged. See 123 CONG. REC.
H 1440 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi in floor debate on MBE provision in
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977).
32. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 24-25. Financial institu-
tions are reluctant to extend credit and capital to MBEs lacking sufficient equity. Id This
problem for MBEs and other small businesses was recognized by Congress when it passed
the Small Business Investment Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-595, § 2(b), 86 Stat.
1314 (amending Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 681(d) (1976)). See
note 42 infra. See also 118 CONG. REC. 35378 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tower).
33. See Comment, Minority Construction Contractors, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 693,
694-95 (1977). This problem has been noted frequently in Congress. See 115 CONG. REC.
19383 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Bayh, quoting National Business League report indicating
that 70% of Negro contractors report losing contracts due to inability to secure bonding); 116
CONG. REc. 18888 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Bayh, quoting from letter of Office of Minority
Business Enterprise program officer which stated that surety companies have historically
refused to bond MBEs in the construction industry on a par with nonminority businesses).
34. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 24-28. The Commis-
sion's study noted MBEs' lack of awareness of future bidding opportunities, inadequate
marketing staff, lack of familiarity with government contracting regulations and inadequate
or untimely. submission of bids and proposals. See also 116 CONG. REC. 18888-89 (1970)
(remarks of Sen. Bayh, quoting program officer for OMBE).
35. There are no federal requirements for full and free competition in subcontracting.
[Vol. 28:121
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state of the economy, 36 and racial bias.37 The significant problems faced
by MBEs have not gone unrecognized in Congress
38 or by the President.39
C Federal Efforts to Assist Minority Business Enterprises
The federal government has provided minority business with a number
of assistance programs.4° Congressional initiatives have resulted in the
Small Business Administration's section 8(a) procurement program,41 sec-
See 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.202-30 (1977) (requires competition to the "maximum practical extent
consistent with the objectives and requirements of the contract"); U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 28 (preselection frequently factors out MBEs).
36. See M. Hall & 0. Scott, Minority Enterprise and Public Policy 29 (Congressional
Research Service Monograph No. 77-177e June 9, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Minority En-
terprise and Public Policy]. Undercapitalized firms are hurt most during periods of reces-
sion as a result of the increased inaccessibility to financing and credit. Similarly, higher
supply costs, interest rates, and wages during inflationary periods weaken MBEs' competi-
tive positions.
37. The effects of past discrimination continue to place MBEs at a distinct disadvantage
since they have not been able to build up the extensive business contacts which sustain
,nonminority firms. In November 1976, the House Committee on Small Business described
the problems still facing MBEs:
The very basic problem . . . is that, over the years, there has developed a busi-
ness system which has traditionally excluded measurable minority participation.
In'the past more than the present, this system of conducting business transactions
overtly precluded minority input. Currently, we more often encounter a business
system which is racially neutral on its face, but because of past overt social and
economic discrimination is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate these past
inequities.
HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE COMM. ON SMALL
BUSINESS, H.R. Doc. No. 1791, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1977). See also U.S. COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 20-22. The Commission reports of one federal procure-
ment official who recently stated that "[a] lot of minority firms are like leeches. They don't
want to go out on their own and do a little hard work." Id at 21. That racial discrimina-
tion continues to plague MBEs has also been noted in Congress. See Hearings on H.R. 567,
4960 and 2379 Before the Subcomm. on Minority Enterprise and General Oversight of the
House Comm, on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 42 (1977) (statements of Reps.
Addabbo and Mitchell) (discrimination is the simple reason why minority enterprise has not
kept up with national minority population growth).
38. Congressmen often have spoken on the floor regarding the problems faced by
MBEs. See statements cited in notes 30-34 & 37 supra. It should also be noted that the
report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights on MBEs, supra note 19, was sub-
mitted to Congress and the President pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(b) (1976).
39. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
40. For a list of over 100 federal agency programs which provide financial, marketing
and management assistance to minority and other small businesses, see OFFICE OF MINOR-
ITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
FOR MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1977).
41. The SBA administers a procurement program under section 8(a) of the Small Busi-
ness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1976), which gives the agency the power to contract to provide
goods and services to federal agencies and, in turn, to subcontract the actual work to small
Note
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tion 301(d) minority investment program,4 2 and the Surety Bond Guaran-
tee Program.43 Executive initiative has come largely from Executive
Order 11,625,"4 which established minority enterprise as a national goal.
Under its mandate, a number of MBE programs have been instituted by
federal agencies, and mandatory affirmative action provisions have been
included in federal contracts. 45 For example, all federal agencies are re-
quired to have minority procurement programs which assure that efforts
are undertaken to provide MBEs with subcontracting opportunities.
4 6
President Carter has also voiced his support of special efforts to increase
MBE participation in federal contracting, most recently with an "initia-
tive" to triple the amount of federal procurement from MBEs by fiscal
year 1979, 47 and by his support of the MBE set-aside provision in the Pub-
businesses. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1 (1978). Since 1968, this authority has been used by the
SBA to assist MBEs in particular. See Minority Enterprise and Public Policy, supra note
36, at 52-53. For a detailed discussion of the program and its shortcomings, see Comment,
supra note 33, at 695-710. The program has withstood attack as a legitimate exercise of
administrative power. See, e.g., Valley Forge Flag Co. v. Kleppe, 506 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 914 (1974). It must be noted, however, that the program does not use strict racial
categorizations. It has also never been attacked on constitutional grounds. Recently, the
Congress passed a bill sponsored by Congressman Addabbo providing statutory support to
SBA's implementation of the program as an MBE assistance program. See Pub. L. No. 95-
507 (October 24, 1978).
42. The SBA administers the "301(d)" investment program pursuant to the Small Busi-
ness Investment Act of 1958, § 301(d), 15 U.S.C. § 681(d) (1976). Since 1969, 301(d) has
been operated as a minority enterprise small business investment company (MESBIC) pro-
gram offering increased financial assistance to those companies which invest primarily in
small minority enterprises. See Minority Enterprise and Public Policy, supra note 36, at 51-
52.
43. Under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 694(b), (a)
(1976), the SBA was authorized to establish this program to cover surety companies for up to
90% of their losses on bonds. The program covers contracts of up to one million dollars.
44. 3 C.F.R. § 616 (1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 631 app., at 1138 (1976). For the
objectives of the order see note 26 supra. There has been no case law dealing with Exec.
Order No. 11,625.
45. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.1300 to 1.1310-2 (1977) (requiring federal prime and
subcontractors to seek out and employ MBEs in federal contracts); DOT Minority Business
Enterprise Order 4000.7A, discussed in note 9 supra.
46. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1310 (1977). This regulation requires that MBEs be given the
"maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of Government con-
tracts" as subcontractors. Specific clauses to that effect must be included in contracts
greater than $10,000 and less than $500,000. 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.1310-2 (1977). For contracts
over $500,000, prime contractors may be required to establish an MBE subcontracting pro-
gram. Id The efficacy of these regulations has been challenged. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 77-84.
47. See National Urban Policy, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 581, 588 (March 27,
1978). This "initiative" is part of the comprehensive national urban policy package which
President Carter submitted to Congress. Another "initiative" proposed in the same package
requests all federal agencies to include goals for MBE participation in their contracts and
[Vol. 28:121
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lic Works Employment Act of 1977.48
The concept of requiring MBE percentages as a means of increasing
MBE participation is not a new one.49 At least one federal agency has
begun to require MBE set-asides as a means of reaching MBE percentage
goals.50 However, the MBE set-aside as part of a national public works
project is unprecedented in its scope.
The MBE set-aside provision in the Public Works Employment Act is a
nationwide racial percentage requirement, which, although mandated by
Congress, is supported by only scanty formal legislative history. Intro-
duced from the floor during debate on the full Act, 5' there were no back-
ground studies undertaken or committee reports made. As a result,
challenges have been brought on the ground that since no specific findings
of previous discrimination were made, the provision is unconstitutionally
preferential, rather than remedial in nature.
52
No case law exists defining the constitutional limits of Executive Order
11,625 or determining the legality of other specific affirmative action meas-
ures which have been taken to increase MBE utilization in the federal con-
tracting process. Therefore, in order to evaluate the constitutionality of
the MBE provision in the Public Works Employment Act, it is instructive
to examine how the courts have treated the use of similar minority percent-
age requirements in other areas.
II. MINORITY PERCENTAGE GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS
Affirmative action measures, including the establishment of specific
goals and timetables, are required of federal contracting agencies and con-
grants programs. He commended five agencies for proposed improvements in their MBE
programs, including DOT's MBE program described in note 9 supra Id at 588.
48. In his state of the union address, President Carter stated: "We will continue to en-
force the $400 million minority business set-aside provision in the local public works act,
and may exceed that target." 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 90, 112 (Jan. 19, 1978).
49. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 431 F.
Supp. 854 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (school board does not have the authority to establish MBE
percentage requirement, but the state can do so and can authorize the school board to do so).
Massachusetts and Illinois have programs applicable to certain projects which establish per-
centage requirements of MBE contractor and subcontractor participation in construction
projects. See Note, Federal Contract Compliance- Use of Special Contract Provisions to En-
courage Minority Employment, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 913, 926-27 (1977).
50. See note 9 supra.
51. See note 73 and accompanying text in ra.
52. Such a challenge was successfully made in Wright Farms Constr., Inc. v. Kreps, 444
F. Supp. 1023 (D. Vt. 1977). See notes 91-94, and accompanying text infra. Cf Flanagan
v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377, 384 (D.D.C. 1977).
See note 61 and accompanying text i/t~a; but see Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps,
446 F. Supp. 553, 567 (D.R.I. 1978), discussed at notes 87-88 nfra.
Note
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tractors for reaching reasonable minority representation in their work
forces.53 Under the authority of Executive Order 11,246 and pursuant to
public hearings and other data investigations, the Department of Labor
has established specific affirmative action plans for federal contractors in a
number of metropolitan areas. 54 The first such program imposed by the
Department of Labor was the so-called "Philadelphia Plan", which re-
quired that bids on any federal or federally-assisted construction contracts
in the Philadelphia metropolitan area include affirmative action plans set-
ting out specific goals for minority utilization in six skilled crafts.55 The
Philadelphia Plan was subsequently upheld as valid action within the ex-
ecutive power, and proscribed by neither Titles VI or VII of the Civil
Rights Act nor the fifth amendment to the Constitution.56 The constitu-
tionality of this plan, and others similar to it, was recently reaffirmed in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
57
53. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1977) (covering contractors dealing directly with gov-
ernment or involved in federally assisted construction); 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2 to 60-2.32 (1977)
(special rules for nonconstruction contractors). In establishing these goals and timetables,
consideration is given to a number of factors, including the minority population in the facil-
ity's labor area and its unemployment rate, the percentage of such minority work force com-
pared with the total work force in the labor area and the general availability of minorities
having requisite skills in the labor force area. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1977).
54. Eg., 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-5 to 60-11 (1977). Based on clear findings that under utiliza-
tion of minority workers exists in certain skilled trades in the construction industries and has
resulted from exclusionary hiring practices, see, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-5.10 (1977), the plans
require hiring goals and timetables for specified trades. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60.5.21(a)
(1977).
55. See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 163 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
56. 442 F.2d at 171, 173-74, 176-77. The court cited the past exclusionary practices of
the unions, id at 173, and the federal government's "vital interest" in having available the
largest pool of qualified manpower possible, id at 171, in upholding the plan's requirement
of good faith efforts by federal contractors to achieve specific goals of minority employment
in the particular trades. See also Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1972) (Illinois Ogilvie Plan); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St.
2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907, 908 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970) (Cleveland Plan); Joyce
v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970) (Newark Plan).
57. 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2754-55 n.40 (1978). One of the other cases reaffirmed in Bakke was
Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). In that case, the court upheld a state-imposed 20% minority
hiring goal in a federally-funded state construction project. Although a federal affirmative
action plan (Boston Plan) did exist, the state made independent findings that minority mem-
bership in the unions (and therefore in the construction trades) was disproportionately low
and that the Boston Plan was inadequate to redress such disparities. The state's plan dif-
fered in that it required a percentage goal for the entire project and not just within specific
trades, and that it required contractors to take every possible measure to reach the goal, as
opposed to the Boston Plan's good faith effort requirement. Id at 12. The court cited the
consistent general purposes behind each plan, id at 14, the state's specific findings of historic
minority exclusion, id at 12-14, the compelling need to remedy such a "serious racial imbal-
ance," id at 18, the reasonableness of the percentage figure, id., and adequate notice to the
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In addition, the use of racial quotas to overcome the effects of past dis-
criminatory patterns and practices in the areas of both employment 58 and
legislative apportionment59 has withstood constitutional attack. In educa-
tion, the Supreme Court has upheld the use of approximate racial ratios in
student and faculty assignments 6° in order to remedy the present effects of
contractor and a meaningful opportunity to prove the requisite compliance efforts, id at 19.
The First Circuit's reliance on statistics, however, as evidence of discrimination, must be
evaluated in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (statistics alone do not prove
discrimination).
58. In employment, an affirmative action override has been adjudged permissible in the
area of promotional opportunities for minorities and women, subsequent to the employer's
admission of previous discriminatory patterns and practices, and pursuant to a negotiated
consent decree. EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3145
(1978). The override provides that when any Bell System company cannot achieve its pre-
scribed minority/women promotion target (based on the availability of minorities and wo-
men in the relevant labor market) through utilization of normal selection standards, it must
pass over more qualified or more senior candidates in favor of minorities who possess at
least basic qualifications. 556 F.2d at 171-72. The court responded specifically to the
charge that such a racial quota was unconstitutional. Employing the "strict scrutiny" test
traditionally used for racial classifications, the court found the "substantial" state interest in
"remedying the effect of a particular pattern of employment discrimination upon the bal-
ance of sex and racial groups" justified the discrimination inherent in the plan. Id at 179.
Recognizing that discrimination is often difficult to prove on a case by case basis, and that
the identification of those deterred from seeking employment or promotion due to reports of
racially discriminatory practices can be impossible, the Third Circuit held the remedy fash-
ioned in this case to be constitutionally permissible because it was "reasonably calculated to
counteract the detrimental effects a particular identifiable pattern of discrimination has had
upon the prospects of achieving a society in which the distribution of jobs to basically quali-
fied members of sex and racial groups is not affected by discrimination." Id See also Davis
v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1342-44 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct.
3087 (1978) (device of accelerated goals or quotas based on race to remedy the effects of past
discrimination is constitutional).
In contrast, the training plan employed in Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 563
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), pettionfor cert. docketed, No. 78-435 (Sept. 14, 1978), requiring the
admission of one minority worker to the training program for every white worker admitted
until the percentage of minority craft workers reached the approximate percentage of the
minority population in the surrounding area, was invalidated under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. The program was undertaken voluntarily by Kaiser in an attempt to comply
fully with the requirements of Exec. Order No. 11,246. The court's ruling was based on a
finding that there had been no history of discriminatory hiring or promotion at Kaiser, and
that the plan was therefore not an equitable remedy, but an unlawful racial preference pro-
hibited by Title VII. Id at 224. See also Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 446 F.
Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (voluntarily implemented racial quota promotion plan violates
Title VII).
59. In the area of legislative apportionment, the Supreme Court recently upheld the use
of specific racial numerical quotas in drawing election district boundaries. United Jewish
Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). The Court held that in order to ensure compliance
with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a state may deliberately create black majorities in
certain election districts through the realignment of district boundaries. Id at 161.
60. See Swarm v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971) (student assignment); United
States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235-37 (1968) (faculty assignment).
Note
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purposeful past discrimination. However, absent a finding of previous
discrimination, a voluntarily assumed set-aside of scholarship funds for
"minority" students by a university has been held violative of Title VI by a
lower court.6 ' In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,62 one of
the most controversial civil rights cases in a number of years, the Supreme
Court held that a medical school's special admissions program for minor-
ity applicants, by totally foreclosing consideration of nonminorities, was
illegal, but that race may nevertheless be used as a factor in the admissions
process.63 Although the full meaning and impact of the Court's decision
may not be clearly understood for several years, Justice Powell's plurality
opinion emphasized several items relevant to the use of racial quotas by
the federal government in employment. He reiterated that any racial dis-
tinction is "inherently suspect" and requires the "most exacting scru-
tiny.'" 4 He stressed that findings of racially discriminatory practices were
a prerequisite to instituting a remedial program based on race, and distin-
guished the preferential hiring cases under Executive Order 11,246 as
based on the determination of previous discrimination made by a legisla-
tive or administrative body.65 He also emphasized that congressionally
authorized administrative actions are not affected by the decision,66 and
reaffirmed "the special competence of Congress to make findings with re-
spect to the effects of identified past discrimination and its discretionary
authority to take appropriate remedial measures. '67 In addition, four jus-
61. See Flanagan v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377
(D.D.C. 1976). Even though white students could fall within the minority classification on
the basis of social or economic disadvantage, the court held that because access to the "fa-
vored" category was more difficult for whites than for blacks, the set-aside constituted dis-
crimination proscribed by both Title VI and the Constitution. Id at 382. The court also
cited the lack of any finding that the university had been guilty of past discrimination. Id
at 384.
62. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
63. Id at 2764. Although nonminorities made application under the economically dis-
advantaged criteria, the University conceded they were never actually considered in the spe-
cial admissions program.
64. Id at 2749. However, it is not clear whether Justice Powell was prescribing the
traditional "strict scrutiny" test or a slightly less stringent one. See id at 2756-57.
65. Id at 2754-55 & n.40. These cases are cited in notes 55-57 supra. Since the Uni-
versity was not charged with any such responsibility, it is unclear whether the Court would
have allowed the special admissions program to stand even had there been findings of previ-
ous discrimination made by the University.
66. Id at 2755 n.41.
67. Id He cited Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) and Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), as examples of Congress passing appropriate legislation under
its section 5, fourteenth amendment and section 2, thirteenth amendment powers to remedy
the effects of previous discrimination. 98 S. Ct. at 2755. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the
Supreme Court upheld § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976), as an
appropriate exercise of congressional powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, even
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tices separately approved the MBE provision in the Public Works Employ-
ment Act, and cited other congressional enactments requiring race-
conscious measures in order to remedy disadvantages suffered by racial
minorities.68 They also noted that Congress, fully aware of the relevance
of Title VI, limited its application in the Public Works Employment Act by
passage of the subsequent and more specific remedial legislation.
69
III. THE PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1977
The Public Works Employment Act of 1977,70 extending and amending
an earlier public works act,7' was designed not only to provide additional
funding for badly needed public facilities but also to funnel more accu-
rately such funds into the areas of greatest unemployment. 72 The MBE
provision within the Act was first introduced from the floor of the House
though Congress had made no specific findings of the need for or purpose of the provision.
Section 4(e) of the Act provides that no person who has completed sixth grade in an Ameri-
can school can be disqualified from voting by a Spanish language literacy test. Just as with
the MBE provision in the Public Works Employment Act, § 4(e) had been introduced during
floor debate on the full Voting Rights Act, and therefore no committee hearings took place
nor were any reports made concerning the section. Nevertheless, the Court in Katzenbach
deferred to Congress as the proper branch to weigh competing considerations, and refused
to review the congressional determination. It recognized that certain "realities [are] familiar
to the legislators" in requiring only a reasonable basis on which Congress could have acted
to justify the provision. 384 U.S. at 653. The Court reiterated that § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment is a "positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation" is necessary to secure fourteenth
amendment guarantees. Id. at 651.
68. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2778-79 & n.25 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring & dissenting).
69. Id at 2778-79. Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist found the special
admissions program at the medical school unlawful on purely statutory grounds, as violative
of Title VI. Id at 2815. "Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation
in a federally funded program." Id. at 2813-14. In so deciding, these justices stated that
Title VI might proscribe actions which the Constitution does not. Id. at 2813. They did not
address the question of the program's constitutionality.
70. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701 to 6710 (West Supp. 1978). See note 11 Isupra.
71. Local Public Works Capital Development & Investment Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6701-6710 (West Supp. 1977). The Secretary of Commerce was given the responsibility
of dispensing the funds through the Economic Development Administration, Id. at § 6701,
and priority was to be given to those state or local governments with unemployment rates
over the national unemployment rate. Id. at 6707(c). Concerned with the "long lag time
sometimes associated with public works programs," Congress intended the projects to be
funded and construction to begin quickly. H.R. REP. No. 1077, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1976).
72. See H.R. REP. No. 20, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). Provisions ensuring prompt
implementation were again included, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6705(d), 6707(h)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
Other provisions include a "Buy American" requirement, Id. at § 6705(f)(l)(A), two veter-
ans preferences, Id. at § 6706, and an Indian tribe and Alaskan Native villages set-aside, Id.
at § 6707(a)(1).
Catholic University Law Review
by Representative Parren Mitchell during debate on the full bill to amend
and extend the program.73 In introducing the provision, Rep. Mitchell
noted the failure of existing programs to aid MBEs and emphasized that
the minority business requirement was "the only way we are going to get
the minority enterprises into our system."'74 A similar provision was also
introduced by Senator Edward Brooke during consideration of the Senate
version of the bill.75 In support of the provision, Sen. Brooke categorized
it as "a legitimate tool to insure a participation by hitherto excluded or
unrepresented groups," as necessary "because minority businesses have re-
ceived only I percent of the Federal contract dollar, despite repeated legis-
lation, Executive orders, and regulations mandating affirmative efforts to
include minority contractors in the Federal contracts pool."'76
The MBE provision has been attacked on both statutory and constitu-
tional grounds in numerous lawsuits across the country.77 Although a
handful of suits are still pending, a majority of the courts have either de-
nied preliminary injunctions or reached final decisions of constitutional-
ity.7 8 In Fullilove v. Kreps,79 the first district court decision on the merits
to hold the provision constitutional, the court employed the strict scrutiny
equal protection test traditionally used with "suspect" classifications.
80
Conceding the lack of a specific congressional purpose to aid minorities in
the formal legislative history of the Act, the court looked instead to what it
termed the "debate rhetoric" and the "societal and legislative context" of
the provision8' to find a compelling interest in resolving the problem of
73. See 123 CONG. REc. H1436 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977).
74. Id at H1437. He stated that the provision was "designed to begin to redress this
grievance that has been extant for so long" and was necessary in order to give "local political
subdivisions. . . the added impetus to do those things that are right and fair." Id. at 1440.
Representative Biaggi (D.N.Y.) argued that the Public Works Employment bill could be
inequitable to MBEs without the provision and cited data on the underrepresentation of
MBEs in federal contracting. Id Representative Conyers (D. Mich.) supported the provision
as a method of remedying the situation in which MBEs "get the 'works' "when trying to bid
on contracts and have not been able to compete effectively through no fault of their own.
Id
75. See 123 CONG. REc. S3910 (daily ed. March 10, 1977).
76. Id
77. See note 16 supra and cases discussed therein.
78. Id
79. 443 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978).
80. 443 F. Supp. at 257. When a "suspect" class is involved, this standard of review
requires that a challenged provision be either "necessary" or the most narrowly drawn
means by which to achieve a compelling state interest. Id See Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race held to be suspect classification requiring "most rigid scrutiny").
See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage is a suspect class).
81. This includes the ample empirical data available to Members of Congress and their
knowledge of numerous antidiscrimination measures taken by the government in recent
years. 443 F. Supp. at 257-59. Citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the
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racial discrimination against MBEs in many areas of the country.8 2 The
court also concluded that the means adopted by Congress to resolve this
problem were necessary, given the consistent failure of previous programs,
the nature of this program, and the lack of less obtrusive but still effective
alternatives.
8 3
The Fullilove decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit in an opinion
handed down after Bakke. On appeal, it was not disputed that a compel-
ling state interest was served by remedying past discrimination. 4 Instead,
appellants argued that there had not been a sufficient legislative record to
support the lower court's conclusion about the set-aside.85 The Second
Circuit ruled, however, that in view of the extensive legislation during the
past few years aimed at eradicating racial discrimination, no other purpose
could be ascribed to it.86 In a recent decision, however, the absence of
legislative findings was explained by the United States District Court in
Rhode Island as evidence of a clear consensus that such a remedy was
required. s7 The court disputed the need for making "judicial-like" find-
ings of past discrimination prior to enacting remedies.88 Moreover, the
court identified three separate constitutional sources of congressional
power which could justify the use of such benign racial classifications.
8 9
court emphasized that the crucial issue was not whether Congress had made a specific find-
ing of previous racial discrimination in the construction industry, but was whether such a
finding could have been justified. 443 F. Supp. at 259-60 n.15.
82. Id at 260.
83. Id. at 260-62. Important considerations were the short-term nature of the program
and the reasonableness of the 10% figure. Id at 261-62. In addition, the court found in-
credible the plaintiffs' argument that the MBE requirement violated the Civil Rights Acts of
1866 and 1964, for if race sensitive remedial measures could not be taken to correct racial
discrimination's effects, "minority groups would forever be frozen into the status quo." Id
at 262.
84. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1978); see Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2757-59.
The Second Circuit found it unnecessary to determine whether such a compelling state inter-
est was needed to justify the discriminatory allocation of federal funds since it believed the
provision could pass whatever scrutiny could be applied to it.
85. 584 F.2d at 603.
86. Id at 604-05. The court indicated that it would be less deferential toward a similar
provision if mandated by a state legislature or by an administrative agency since these bod-
ies do not share Congress' competence for ameliorating the effects of past discrimination.
Id. at 604 (citing Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2755).
87. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 348 n.4 (D.R.I. 1978).
88. The court noted that Congress is so familiar with the history of racial discrimination
that reciting detailed findings of fact is unnecessary. Id at 348 n.4, 354-55. In addition, the
court indicated that traditional judicial deference should be exercised in the context of con-
gressional findings of racial imbalance and discrimination. Id at 355. However, the court
agreed with the Fullilove decision that the provision passed even the strict scrutiny test. Id
at 357.
89. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 346-47 (D.R.I. 1978).
These congressional powers, derived from the Constitution, are (1) the spending power, to
Note
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Lower court denials of preliminary injunctions generally have been up-
held by courts of appeals.90 One district court, however, has found the
MBE provision unconstitutional as applied. In Wright Farms Construction,
Inc. v. Kreps,91 the Vermont district court concluded that a specific finding
of previous discrimination is a prerequisite to the permissible use of racial
quotas.92 The court found no such discrimination against minorities in
the state of Vermont and was unable to point to any such determination by
Congress.93 The court, however, specifically limited its decision to the
facts of that particular case.
94
A district court in California has, in addition, held the MBE provision
unconstitutional on its face.95 The government appealed the decision di-
be exercised for the common good (art. I, § 1, cl. 1), (2) the power to prevent federal, state,
and local governments from involvement in private discriminatory practices (amend. XIV, §
5), and (3) the power to eradicate "the badges and incidents of slavery" (amend. XIII, § 2).
Id The court found that Congress could rationally have determined, given the pervasive
discrimination in the construction industry and the disproportionately low percentage of
minority participation in federal contracting, that contracts under the Public Works Em-
ployment Act would be awarded to firms which discriminate against MBEs. In the court's
view, the symbiotic relationship between the discriminating contractor and the federal gov-
ernment implicates the government in such discrimination and triggers congressional reme-
dial enforcement powers under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Id at 349. The court
also noted that Congress has the power to "eliminate the vestiges of the badges and incidents
of slavery which place black businessmen and workers in disadvantageous positions when
they compete for [federal] monies." Id at 363. In this situation, "Congress has declared
that white contractors may not reap 100% of the benefits of governmental contracts merely
because they can outbid minority contractors in a situation also created by socioeconomic
forces tainted by racial discrimination." Id at 364. Thus, the court reasoned that the thir-
teenth amendment would be a "mere paper guarantee if Congress were powerless to assure
the black person an equal chance to earn [a] dollar." Id at 364.
90. See note 16 supra.
91. 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Vt. 1977).
92. Id at 1037. "The use of quotas is constitutional only to the extent that it is reme-
dial." Id
93. Id at 1038-39. In fact, the court cited 1977 statistics showing that the Spanish-
speaking population of Vermont has a higher median income than the nonminority popula-
tion, and that a greater percentage of nonminority families earn below the poverty level than
do black families. Id at 1040. In addition, minorities comprise less than one percent of the
state's population. Id
94. The court pointedly refused to express an opinion as to the constitutionality of the
provision as applied to any other case. Id at 1042. The court distinguished the MBE set-
aside from a "carefully conceived remedial scheme" such as the Voting Rights Act, and
cited the absence of an opportunity to rebut the presumption of discrimination and the rec-
ognizably adverse impact on nonminorities such as the plaintiff. Id at 1039. It is interest-
ing to note that the plaintiff in this case was one corporation made up of only two people,
not a group of construction associations as in all other cases, and the injury plaintiff was able
to establish was considerably more substantial. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers
Local 28, 532 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1976) (effects of remedial program shall not concentrate
upon a small, identifiable group of nonminority persons).
95. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D. Cal.
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rectly to the Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded the case for
consideration of mootness, since all of the funds authorized and appropri-
ated under the Act had been obligated when the district court's judgment
was entered.96 On remand, the district court determined that the issue
was not moot, and reiterated its holding that the set-aside is facially uncon-
stitutional.97 The court acknowledged, however, that its finding of uncon-
stitutionality directly conflicts with the ruling of the several circuit courts
which have passed on this question.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE MBE SET-ASIDE
It appears that the MBE provision in the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977 has been an effective affirmative action tool. The Economic De-
velopment Administration projects that MBE participation in the program
will have exceeded fourteen percent when all projects are completed. 98 As
a measure primarily functioning to increase MBE involvement in a federal
grants program, it must be considered a success.99
The provision's treatment by the courts is instructive regarding its future
usefulness. Of those courts which have reached final decisions, most have
found it constitutional based on a number of factors: (1) the sufficiently
compelling state interest of increasing the level of MBE involvement in
1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3132-33 (1978), a]/don remand, No. 77-3738 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 20, 1978).
96. On the question of mootness, the district court relied upon a series of Supreme
Court decisions holding that an otherwise moot case, "capable of repetition, yet evading
review," can be heard. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911). The court found that although all the currently appropriated funds under the Act
had already been obligated, there was nevertheless a reasonable expectation that Congress
would enact appropriation bills with similar minority set-asides in the near future. Addi-
tionally, the future set-aside would likely "evade review" because of the speed with which
the appropriations are usually spent. Finally, the court found that the Government had not
met the stringent tests for mootness outlined in United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629 (1953) and United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968).
As to the merits of the case, the court concluded that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke
mandated invalidation of the set-aside. Under Bakke, "while affirmative action is permissi-
ble, racial quotas are impermissible and unconstitutional." Although Congress' interest in
promoting minority employment in the construction industry is legitimate, the court con-
cluded that there are less intrusive means than the ten percent quota for accomplishing these
ends. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-3738 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
20, 1978).
97. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra; note 111 infra.
98. Conversation with Lewis Podolske, Programs Specialist, Office of Assistant Secre-
tary, Economic Development Administration in Washington, D.C., (Aug. 4, 1978). This
translates into over $560,000,000 in federal funds to MBEs. See note 31 supra.
99. It will be left to other analyses to evaluate other aspects of the program, such as the
frequently criticized MBE certification procedure (which apparently facilitates the involve-
ment of non-bonafide MBEs) and the complex problem of MBE failures.
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federal contracts and programs in order to remedy the effects of past dis-
crimination,1l° (2) the abysmal failure of previous remedial programs us-
ing less intrusive means,101 (3) the resultant need for a different and
especially ambitious remedial scheme, 0 2 and (4) the reasonableness of the
ten percent figure, given the availability of MBE firms in the types of work
to be done. 10 3 As further justification, the courts have pointed to the
short-term nature of the program and its specifically expeditious sched-
ule, 1' 4 both of which serve the Act's objectives of reducing existing unem-
ployment and providing public facilities as quickly as possible. These two
factors contributed largely to the granting of only prospective relief by
those few courts which found the provision unconstitutional.
0 5
The court challenges have been strongest in their attack on the adequacy
of legislative findings of previous discrimination against MBEs. Arguing
that such findings are an essential prerequisite to the lawful fashioning of
such a race-specific remedy and are absent in the legislative history of this
Act, the Vermont federal district court concluded in Wright Farms that the
provision was unconstitutional as applied. 0 6 This case is important not
only because of its singular determination of unconstitutionality, but also
because it points out a troubling aspect of the provision. The ten percent
minority requirement applies nationwide and is not adjustable to the spe-
cific remedial requirements of particular geographic areas. 10 7 Although
the ten percent figure is an entirely reasonable one on a national scale, as a
majority of the courts have concluded, it is arguably inapposite in an area
in which less than one percent of the population is minority. 08 Most of
the courts, however, have accepted what legislative history exists from the
100. See, e.g., notes 82 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
101. See, e.g., text accompanying note 83 supra.
102. See, e.g., notes 83, 87 & 88 and accompanying text supra.
103. See, e.g., note 83 supra.
104. Id All grants have been obligated under the program, and Congress must approve
any extension; therefore, the legislature can evaluate, at that time, whether the MBE provi-
sion remains necessary and reasonable. This element of oversight is critical to such an
ambitious program. See also note 11 supra.
105. A significant local benefit inures in such a program, and the courts were reluctant to
impose retroactive relief, given the counterproductivity such relief would have on the local
economies. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp.
955, 970-71 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 3132 (1978).
106. 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Vt. 1977). See notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra.
107. Although a waiver of this figure may be obtained in some cases, the EDA GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 12, indicate that the waiver is quite difficult to obtain. See note 13 supra.
108. This argument presupposes that the most fair and reasonable MBE participation
rate is that which most closely approximates the actual minority representation in the rele-
vant labor market. This makes no allowance for the increased minority influx which might
take place as areas provide more minority employment opportunities.
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floor debates' °9 and have also factored in Congress' general awareness of
the history of racial discrimination in this country and the general societal
context surrounding the bill's enactment.110
One additional and significant distinction between this provision and
those racial quotas or goals which have been struck down as unconstitu-
tional"' is the combined legislative and executive support it has re-
ceived." 12 Not only does it have the important congressional mandate," 3
but the executive branch has repeatedly called for increased MBE partici-
pation in federal contracts and grants, and specifically supports this provi-
sion." 4 Moreover, MBE set-asides are supported by legislative
determinations of both a compelling state interest to be served and the
necessity for this provision. As such, the MBE set-aside appears to be the
type of remedial measure which a majority of the Supreme Court would
find acceptable.' 15
It is important to put the Act itself into perspective. It provides public
109. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra.
110. See, e.g., notes 81, 85, 86, & 88 and accompanying text supra. Even without the
evidence of past and present racial discrimination, the statistical evidence alone is sufficient
to support an inference that discriminatory treatment has impeded minority access to busi-
ness ownership. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977);
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
111. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978); Weber v.
Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977) petitionfor cert. docketed, No.
78-435 (Sept. 14, 1978); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.
Mich. 1978). These cases are discussed in notes 58 & 62-69 and accompanying text supra.
112. This provides it with at least an initial presumption of constitutionality. See notes
23 & 29 supra. Traditional judicial deference to a coequal branch is then afforded to the
legislative determination of the existence of a "compelling state interest" for which the
measure is "necessary." It could be argued that no deference is owed when strict scrutiny is
triggered. Nevertheless, that deference has been extended in the case of this congressionally
authorized provision. See, e.g., notes 81 & 88 supra.
113. The significance of such a legislative endorsement is supported by the Supreme
Court's decision in Bakke. Justice Powell speaks of the appropriateness of the congres-
sional forum for fashioning remedies to identified past discrimination. See notes 64-67 and
accompanying text supra. It is possible that Justice Powell might have concluded that the
legislative history is so lacking in specific findings that Congress did not appropriately fulfill
its fact-finding task. However, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), specifically
supports the constitutionality of a section of the Voting Rights Act which is as lacking in
formal legislative history as is the MBE provision. Moreover, in a separate opinion of
Bakke, the MBE provision is specifically and approvingly cited by four Justices who also
dismiss any conflict between the MBE provision and Title VI. See notes 67-68 and accom-
panying text supra. Four other justices, on the other hand, advocate a wholly different
statutory interpretation. See note 69 supra.
114. See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes Ill & 113 supra. It has been suggested that the use of socially and eco-
nomically disadvantaged, rather than racial, criteria is easier to defend legally. In industries
such as construction, however, the most pressing problems are related directly to race rather
than to economic status.
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funds to high unemployment areas, with special emphasis on relieving un-
employment in the construction industry. It contains a number of "na-
tional goals" clauses, preferences and set-asides other than the MBE set-
aside,"16 most of which reflect a national concern about the high unem-
ployment rates and economically depressed status of certain segments of
the American population. 1 7 The MBE provision responds specifically to
that concern."18 As a federal grants program, which dispenses funds from
all American taxpayers, the Act is especially and appropriately suited to
utilization as a tool to further legitimate national policy goals. Congress
could, and did, make the determination that this program was the proper
vehicle for a particularly ambitious remedial scheme.
As a result of the success of this program in bringing MBEs into the
mainstream of federal contracting, it is unfortunate that the use of MBE
set-asides will not immediately become more widespread. The part of
President Carter's urban policy package which included an MBE set-aside
provision for the creation of a three-year Labor Intensive Public Works
program has failed to gather sufficient congressional support."19 Some-
what different from the Public Works Employment Act's MBE provision,
it provided for a national "set-aside" of ten percent of grant funds for
MBEs, with a flexible range between two and fifteen percent for each com-
munity depending upon the availability of minority group members in
each area.' 20 As such it was adjustable to the diverse requirements of
116. See notes 24 & 72 supra.
117. As Rep. Biaggi noted during floor debate, see note 74 supra, the MBE provision was
required to prevent this program from becoming yet another federally funded project result-
ing in inequities to MBEs, given the severe underrepresentation of MBEs in federal con-
tracting. The courts which have evaluated the MBE provision have also recognized the
extent to which the federal government is implicated in the funding of projects which "per-
petuate" the effects of previous discrimination. See note 89 supra. It can also be argued
that this "perpetuation" is actually discrimination in and of itself.
118. As a supplemental program, the MBE program was designed to put additional peo-
ple to work, and therefore does not deprive anyone of existing employment. See Associated
Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 352 n.7 (D.R.I. 1978). It is also arguable that
the Public Works Employment Act does not exclude anyone, but instead requires that fed-
eral dollars be more equitably spread to a larger pool of qualified businesses. See Fullilove
v. Kreps, 584 F.2d at 607-08. The fact that a waiver exists lends support to this interpreta-
tion. If there are no qualified MBEs within a reasonable area, the MBE provision is inap-
plicable. See note 13 supra.
119. Bills introduced into the House and Senate incorporating that proposal failed to
pass. See S. 3186, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., 124 CONO. REc. S8845 (daily ed. June 8, 1978); H.R.
12993, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H5062 (daily ed. June 7, 1978); in addition, a
bill by Congressman Roe to provide an extension for the Public Works Employment Act of
1977 also failed to pass the House. H.R. 11610, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. Rc.
H2184 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1978).
120. H.R. 11610 provided in part:
Each grant and subgrantee must spend at least its prescribed share for minority
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different communities and areas, and avoided the most troublesome aspect
of the Public Works Employment Act's MBE provision.
As a legitimate and highly effective legislative tool for increasing MBE
participation in federal contracting programs, this kind of provision should
have been more widely adopted. Its legality appears firmly established in
the legislative context. Nevertheless, in order to insulate potential legisla-
tive programs from constitutional and statutory attack, it is important that
Congress document the previous discrimination in the applicable areas,
and demonstrate the appropriateness of the remedial scheme to the resolu-
tion of the problem. In addition, the statute should specifically clarify its
consistency with Title VI and its benign and remedial purpose.
As for the outlook on administrative utilization of the MBE set-aside, it
appears it would be acceptable for a federal agency to make a finding of
past discriminatory patterns or practices within an industry or within the
agency itself, and then to justify the set-aside as a remedial scheme appro-
priately designed to redress that discrimination.' 2 ' The executive agencies
are particularly suited to making such findings and fashioning appropriate
remedies since they have specific resources and expertise in their fields
which Congress does not. They can also evaluate the need for a proce-
dure such as the MBE set-aside on a contract by contract, or grant by
grant, basis as opposed to program-wide application which is done by the
legislature. Executive agencies can thereby avoid the challenge of arbi-
trariness by reacting to specific factual contexts in different ways, each rea-
sonably related to the various requirements.
In the area of federal contracts and grants programs, the legislative and
agency-wide adoption of MBE set-asides 22 would have an immediate
beneficial impact on the minority business community. By requiring a
specific and reasonable percentage of qualified MBE participation, the set-
aside forces contractors to look beyond their tightly established circle of
businegs connections. It also provides MBEs with a chance to prove their
business enterprises, unless the Secretary determines otherwise. Such share shall
reflect the percentage of minority-group members within the population residing in
the area served by such grantee or in areas from which minority business enter-
prises might reasonably be expected to travel to perform services on projects activi-
ties in the area served by the grantee. The prescribed shares shall be set between
2% and 15%, so that at least 10% of the funds appropriated nationally under this
title are targeted for minority business enterprises.
121. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2754 & n.40 (1978); but
see note 86 supra.
122. These can be employed either as an end unto themselves or as a means to reach a
percentage goal, as is the case with the MBE set-aside provision in the Department of Trans-
portation's MBE program. Given the President's call for a tripling of MBE procurement in
federal programs by fiscal year 1979, this procedure is especially useful as a means of admin-
istrative compliance.
Note
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capabilities, an opportunity long denied them, first through overt discrimi-
nation and presently through more subtle forces, such as negative stereo-
types and expectations on the part of nonminority contractors. The
provision also encourages the development of bona fide partnerships with
integrated ownership, since businesses with as little as fifty percent minor-
ity ownership qualify for the MBE classification. This arrangement pro-
vides the minority businessperson with the needed experience and business
opportunities while at the same time it provides the nonminority business-
person with the MBE status. In the final analysis, it is necessary to require
MBE participation in the established business community in order to
change the status quo of extreme MBE underrepresentation.
V. CONCLUSION
After eight years of well-meaning but mostly ineffective affirmative ac-
tion efforts on the part of the federal government to improve the lot of
minority business enterprises, Congress has provided minority business
owners with a potentially mighty remedial tool-the MBE set-aside. It
has, for the most part, survived an onslaught of lawsuits challenging its
constitutionality, and the outlook appears bright for adoption of numerous
new applications of its basic theme: a percentage requirement for MBE
participation.
Due to its remedial nature, however, the MBE set-aside should not exist
forever. When MBEs are finally afforded real equal opportunity to com-
pete for contracts and subcontracts, and when the racial make-up of a
business no longer carries with it special favor or disfavor, the minority
set-aside will cease to be needed. Until that time, the MBE provision is
necessary as a powerful tool to implement important national goals and to
foster minority business ownership and development.
Beverly Ann Crosson
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